ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
In the past, military radio design was totally focused on dedicated electronic components. Afterwards, we have witnessed the appearance of software configurable radios (SCR), in which users have the opportunity to choose the most appropriate waveforms for different combat scenarios. In recent years, though, the development of radio communication technology solutions have been submitted to a huge paradigm change -the software defined radio (SDR) technology upspring, in which previously hardware-based features became software defined and users may also introduce new application waveforms on-the-fly.
Such progress is due to several enhancements in different areas like embedded systems, analog-to-digital converters, digital transmission, digital signal processing, multi-band an-tennas, software architectures, and especially in novel General-Purpose Processors (GPP) evaluation capacity. Based on that, SDR foreshadows important consequences and advantages for the development of wireless solutions for military communications systems. Among the envisioned features, we can list interoperability, waveform portability, and the possibility to be updated with the most recent advances in radio communications without hardware replacement requirements. Moreover, SDR is envisioned as the most appropriate platform for cognitive radio development.
At a glance, the high level functional model of a SDR consists of a front end RF subsystem which performs channel selection, downconversion to baseband, and data forwarding onto a software-based processing unit, where the associated digital bitstream is submitted onto appropriate layers (e.g., data link, network, security modules) to perform suitable decoding tasks to extract the desired information. This process is reversed on the transmit side, where the input signal is coded and a modulated signal bearing the associated information suitable for transmission is created. This signal is then passed to the RF subsystem for insertion into the wireless channel.
Due to the multitude of concepts related to the described functional model, several efforts have been done towards the standardization of key elements within the SDR architecture, providing a common platform for the development of SDR sets. The standards supported may be proprietary or industry-developed through a consensus process -while the former approach brings product differentiation to manufacturers, the latter strategy commoditizes the technology, allowing support by third parties in creating the radio platform to achieve specific business objectives.
One of the most typical areas of standardization is the application framework, which provides a common software operation environment, with vendor-free interfaces to set up, configure, control and release application waveforms under operation on a SDR platform. Among several examples of application frameworks relevant to SDR systems, we may cite the Open Mobile Alliance, the Service Availability Forum, and the Software Communications Architecture (SCA) supported by the SDR Forum's SCA Working Group.
The SCA standard was originally proposed by the Joint Tactical Radio System program (JTRS) (SCA, 2001 (SCA, , 2006 (SCA, , 2012 , which is a program for the development of military tactical radios sponsored by the US Department of Defense. The SCA / JTRS standard is becoming the de facto standard for the construction of tactical military radios. However, the interest in the SCA goes beyond the military domain, since this standard has inspired academic and commercial projects (Gonzalez, Carlos, Dietrich, & Reed, 2009) .
Given its growing importance for SDR application vendors and developers in different project domains, one of the first steps in engineering a secure SDR system is the identification of classes of attacks on a SDR, along with the associated threats and vulnerabilities. It precedes the identification of security requirements and the development of security mechanisms (Myagmar, Lee, & Yurcik, 2005) . Therefore, the identification of classes of attacks is necessary for the definition of realistic and relevant security requirements.
A systematic way of classifying intrusions was provided in Lindqvist and Jonsson (1997) . An intrusion is defined by the authors as a successful event from the adversary's point of view, and consists of 1) an attack, in which a vulnerability is exploited, and 2) a breach, which is the resulting violation of the security policy of the system. Essentially, the authors consider two dimensions when classifying intrusions: intrusion techniques and intrusion results. Another type of analysis that can benefit from the knowledge about the classes of attacks that a tactical radio set can suffer is the evaluation of the SDR attack surface. A system's attack surface is the way in which the system will be successfully attacked (Manadhata & Wing, 2010) , and can be used to evaluate the level of security provided by an existing SDR architecture. The attack surface is defined in terms of system resources: if a resource can be used to attack the system, this resource is part of the system's attack surface. By defining an attack surface metric, it is possible to determine if a version A of the system is more or less secure than a version B (Manadhata & Wing, 2010) .
Several works available in the literature deal with SDR security aspects. In Wireless Innovation Forum (2010) , the authors list classes of vulnerabilities, threats and attacks aimed at software defined radios (SCA). It also proposes a Radio Platform Security Architecture. However, this work focus mainly on commercial and public safety radios. In Myagmar et al. (2005) , it is presented a threat analysis aimed specifically at the GNU Radio platform, handled as a case study for the process of threat modeling based on data flow graphs. In 3GPP (2001), classes of threats associated to 3G networks and security requirements related to these threats are listed. In Murotake and Martin (2004) vulnerabilities, threats and attacks on WiFi devices (IEEE 802.11) are described. In SCA Security (2001) the requirements associated with secure SCA military radios, as well as a high-level security architecture and the corresponding security mechanisms are presented. However, the classes of attacks and threats that inspired the requirements are not discussed.
Beyond that, the requirements and mechanisms described in SCA Security (2001) were proposed more than 10 years ago. Therefore, several of the suggested security mechanisms have now known vulnerabilities which are typical to SDR applications -several techniques can be used by an adversary to achieve a particular goal, and, on the other hand, a particular attack technique can be used to achieve different goals. For example, malicious code injection activities can have as objectives either the control of the SDR or to make it inoperable. In this case, the attack "malicious code injection" will belong to several different classes of attacks. So, to the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of works dealing with the classification of attacks and threats on current SCA-compliant SDR sets.
Thus, the objective of this paper is to identify classes of attacks that Software Communications Architecture (SCA) compliant Software Defined Radios (SDR) can suffer. Our emphasis is given in attacks that target the radio set. Attacks on other radio network components, such as systems management software, download servers and other data sources that use the SDR as the physical layer, are not included in the scope of this paper. It should be noted that, with the advancement of technology, new vulnerabilities emerge every day, and with them new forms of threats and attacks on systems. We intend, however, to indicate the classes of attacks that are more relevant for tactical software defined radios, taking into account expected losses for legitimate radio network users.
The classification of attacks presented in this paper is an adaptation of the systematic classification presented by Lindqvist and Jonsson (1997) , which means that several classes of attacks are defined here based on potential attack results on the radio set. This classification can also be associated with the adversary's objectives when planning an intrusion. Thus, the classification presented in this paper can be used to identify the resources that are part of a SDR attack surface, being the first step of the methodology of measuring the attack surface presented in Manadhata and Wing (2010) .
This survey is organized as follows: The first section contains a brief description of the Software Communications Architecture (SCA) standard. Then, we provide definitions of attacks, vulnerabilities, and threats, and also identifies vulnerability classes and several classes of threats. The various classes of attacks on SCA-compliant radios are discussed afterwards, as well as the assumptions and models associated with the definition of these classes. Next, we discuss how attack mitiga-tion strategies can impact a SCA-compliant operating environment. Following that, we present several research directions related to SDR security. Finally, the last section contains our concluding remarks.
SOFTWARE COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE (SCA)
The SCA standard (Gonzalez et al., 2009; SCA, 2001 SCA, , 2006 is an open software infrastructure developed by the U.S. Department of Defense, through the JTRS program, to assist in the development of software defined radios. The standard specifies mechanisms to create, deploy, manage and interconnect component-based radio applications in a distributed platform. The SCA standard has been proposed to enhance the interoperability of radio communications systems and reduce its implementation time and development costs.
The SCA was developed as a scalable architecture capable to support platforms with different capacities, ranging from fixed radio communication stations to portable devices. This scalability, together with the implementation of user-driven features, greatly enhances both the network interoperability and the portability of radio applications, which are desired into military scenarios.
The SCA software structure defines a common operating environment (OE). The OE provides mechanisms for deploying applications on different platforms with different hardware components, device drivers or transport mechanisms, like Digital Signal Processors (DSP), Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA), and General Purpose Processors (GPP). The operating environment also defines interfaces for managing and controlling applications and their components, and these interfaces are independent of particular implementations.
In the SCA context, a radio application is known as a waveform, which is defined as the result of a set of transformations performed in order to overcome disturbances caused by the radio communication channel and possible enemy interference actions. Those transformations are performed on the transmitter and applied to the information that is transmitted through the air. Moreover, this definition also comprises the corresponding set of transformations performed on the receiver to convert the received signals back on the original information.
There is a multitude of typical waveforms (MIL, 2000; NATO, 2000) , comprising physical, data-link, and network layers. Those waveforms describe data transmission security mechanisms, source coding (e.g., voice, image, and video compression), channel coding like FEC -Forward Error Correction and ARQAutomatic Repeat Request, modulation and demodulation techniques, adaptive equalization, automatic gain control, synchronization, filtering, medium access control, among other features (Proakis, 2001 ).
Thus, a SCA waveform is typically composed of interconnected components, through well-defined interfaces, where each component has a clearly stated functionality and can be reused in the development of other waveforms, all of them over a common OE, which is divided into four layers of abstraction:
• Real-time operating system (RTOS); • Middleware (CORBA); • SCA Core Framework (CF); • SCA Services.
The SCA requires a RTOS compatible with the Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) standard. The SCA defines a subset of POSIX called Application Environment Profile (AEP), which limits the operating system services available for radio applications (waveforms). Core Framework components, in turn, have full access to the operating system.
Concerning SCA Services, the SCA standard also defines the utilization of several CORBA services (logging, event, and name services) as specified by the Object Management Group (OMG, http://www.omg.org/). Other non-CORBA services may also be required, as described in the following sections.
The Core Framework (CF) defines a set of interfaces that rule the deployment and management of waveforms and their components (Gonzalez et al., 2009 ). The SCA Core Framework includes four main sets of interfaces:
• Base application interfaces; • Base device interfaces; • Framework control interfaces; • Framework services interfaces.
All the information concerning applications and platforms within the SCA is included in a set of XML files called the Domain Profile (Gonzalez et al., 2009 ). For instance, Software Package Descriptor (SPD) files describe software components and their implementation. Platform characteristics are described by the Device Package Descriptor (DPD) and the Device Configuration Descriptor (DCD). Several other files are also defined. For a complete description of the Domain Profile see (SCA 2006 , SCA 2001 .
In addition to the OE, SCA standard version 2.2 (SCA, 2001) includes a security supplement (SCA Security, 2001 ) that defines U.S. Government security requirements for JTRS radios, a security API and suggests a high level architecture for a secure SCA-compliant radio. The security architecture is composed of several separate partitions: the red partition, the black partition and the cryptographic subsystem (Figure 1) . The red partition stores and processes sensitive information unencrypted or with a low level of protection, and black partition handles non-sensitive or encrypted information. Both partitions are connected by a cryptographic subsystem, which has a bypass mechanism for data that can be transferred unencrypted between black and red partitions.
A SCA-compliant radio set that implements the architecture depicted in Figure 1 is described in Kurdziel, Beane, and Fitton (2005) . The security supplement suggests a physical separation between partitions, i.e., it recommends separate processors for the red and black partitions, and a third one for the cryptographic subsystem. This physical partitioning of functions should also take into account compromising emanations, which involves both the distribution of power and electromagnetic emissions. Depending on the level of confidentiality of the information processed by the red partition, electromagnetic shielding, physical distancing and electrical isolation of physical partitions are mandatory (Tempest, 1982 (Tempest, , 1995 .
From the security viewpoint, the framework control interfaces are particularly important. These interfaces define a set of components that provide management and control capabilities to the CF over the whole radio domain. For instance, the ApplicationFactory interface is used to create instances of a specific waveform. After creating an application, the Application Factory returns an instance of the corresponding Application interface. The DomainManager interface controls and maintains the overall state of the radio. The requirements for the Figure 1 . Basic JTRS security architecture (SCA Security, 2001) IGI GLOBAL PROOF cryptographic subsystem and the INFOSEC boundary are described in the security supplement. SCA standard version 2.2.2 (SCA, 2006) has defined a security specification equivalent to the SCA v2.2 security supplement, but this newer version has not been made public.
In the first quarter of 2012, the JTRS program released the SCA version 4 specification (SCA, 2012) . This new specification is based on the work developed by the SCA Next working group of the Wireless Innovation Forum (SCA Next, 2011 
ATTACKS, VULNERABILITIES, AND THREATS
An attack is a malicious action that aims to explore one or more vulnerabilities, subverting the system security policy. In this paper, we identify the person or organization performing the attack as the adversary. A vulnerability is a defect in the system (either in software or in hardware) relevant for its security (Correia & Sousa, 2010) . The vulnerabilities can be classified as design, implementation or operational, as follows.
Design vulnerabilities are introduced during system design. An example is to use weak encryption and signature mechanisms for secret data. Another example is a protocol design subject to replay attacks.
Implementation vulnerabilities are introduced during the manufacturing and delivery processes. This class of vulnerabilities can be divided into two subclasses: software implementation and hardware implementation vulnerabilities. An example of software implementation vulnerability is the lack of verification of the boundaries of a buffer, leading to buffer overflow vulnerabilities (Hsu, Guo, & Chiueh, 2006 ). An example of hardware implementation vulnerability is the introduction of hardware trojans (Karri, Rajendran, Rosefeld, & Tehranipoor, 2010 ) during chip fabrication. Vulnerabilities related to the supply chain (Swanson, Bartol, & Moorthy, 2010) , e.g., device cloning (Gallo, Kawakami, & Dahab, 2009) , are also included in this subclass.
Operational vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities caused by how the system is operated or is configured. One example is the use of weak passwords in authentication systems.
Related to the concepts of attack and vulnerability, there is a third concept: the threat (Wireless Innovation Forum, 2010). The threat relates to a potential danger associated with a vulnerability, and it can be exploited or not by an adversary. Vulnerabilities create threats, which in turn can be used by attackers to exploit vulnerabilities of a system. A vulnerability may be associated with one or more threats. It is noteworthy that a threat does not always translate into an attack. From the adversary viewpoint, in some cases the expected cost of performing an attack related to a specific threat could be much higher than the expected reward (Gallo, Kawakami, & Dahab, 2011) .
For general-purpose systems, Microsoft has developed a methodology for identifying threats known as Stride (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Escalation of privilege) (Myagmar et al., 2005; Swiderski & Snyder, 2004) . A classification of threats aimed specifically at software defined radios can be found in (Wireless Innovation Forum, 2010) . However, the actual utilization of these classifications in real systems requires experts with extensive knowledge about possible attacks, which makes the application of these methodologies on complex systems inefficient and not scalable in practice (Dhillon, 2011) . Thus, in this paper we focus primarily on defining a classification of attacks that can be used later to perform an analysis of threats in a more scalable way.
In the next section we define classes of attacks applicable to tactical SDRs, with special emphasis on SCA-compliant radio sets, through the analysis of attacks reported in the literature and depending on the defined scenario and adversary model. It should be noted that a class of attacks may be related to several classes of threats, which in turn may be related to several classes of vulnerabilities and several individual vulnerabilities. The process of defining classes of attacks and threats related to a system precedes the definition of system security requirements, and it is the first step in engineering a secure SDR, as explained in the introduction (Myagmar et al., 2005) .
CLASSES OF ATTACKS FOR GENERAL TACTICAL SDRS
In this section, we describe several classes of attacks that a tactical radio set can suffer. Our goal in this paper is to include the classes of attacks that we consider the most relevant, considering expected losses to legitimate users of the tactical radio network, and it is worth remembering that this classification is based on attack results. The scenario for defining attack classes is of a SCA-compliant radio set based on GPPs that implements waveforms that go up to the third OSI layer (network). The SCAcompliant radio set is part of a radio network consisting of a finite and predetermined number of radios. The data transmission between two devices on the radio network always uses some form of encryption. The adversary can act externally to the radio network, or can have direct access to the network by capturing one or more radio sets, with the loss being unnoticed during a finite amount of time. The adversary has the ability to monitor all frequency bands used by the radio network. The adversary is also capable to intervene in the process of manufacturing and delivery of a limited, but crucial, number of components the radio set. As stated in the introduction, the attacks considered in this paper target the radio set. Attacks aimed at other elements of the communication infrastructure (such as waveform download servers) are not included in the scope of this work.
Considering this scenario, the most important classes of attacks for general tactical SDRs identified in this work are:•
• Radio Control: For this class of attacks, the adversary seeks to gain control (total or partial) of the SDR. Through radio control, an adversary can, for example, force the device to behave in a Byzantine, seemingly random, way.
• Personification: For attacks belonging to this class, the goal of the adversary is to fool the radio set, or to introduce himself to the SDR as an entity belonging to the radio network or authorized to access it.
• Unauthorized data modification: This class includes attacks that alter the data stored or being transmitted by the radio set.
• Unauthorized access to data: The attacks of this class seek sensitive internal data and information, without modifying them.
• Denial of service: In this case, the adversary objective is to make the SDR unavailable or non-operational.
Other classes of attacks are possible, but were considered not relevant given the proposed scenario. For example, in Martin (2004) and 3GPP (2001) , there were observed classes of attacks identified as "Unauthorized access to services" and "Rejection." The first case can be included in the class Personification, as explained. The second case concerns an external user that denies to have accessed to the network despite having done it. This case is not relevant in the scenario defined for this paper because of the hypothesis that the radio network is composed of a limited number of previously known and identifiable radio sets. Table 1 shows the classes of attacks and related attack techniques and vulnerabilities. The associations among classes, attack techniques and vulnerabilities are described in greater detail in the following subsections.
Radio Control
In the Radio Control class of attacks, the adversary aims to gain control of all or part of the radio set. This goal can be achieved through the injection of spurious or malicious software that alters the proper functioning of a SDR partition in order to compromise the system security, e.g., by violating its security policy.
There are several ways of introducing malicious code on a SDR, exploiting several vulnerabilities, as exemplified in the following paragraphs. The code injection can be made through the RF interface or via physical access to the SDR, using, for example, a local interface. This type of attack can have different results, as to reduce the radio set functionality or even allowing the adversary to take complete control of it.
• Buffer Overflow: In this attack, the adversary exploits buffer overflow vulnerabilities present in the system software to inject malicious code (Hsu et al., 2006; Riley, Jiang, & Xu, 2010) . A buffer overflow occurs when data stored in a buffer exceeds its capacity. There are two basic types of buffer overflow vulnerabilities: heap-based and stack-based (Correia & Sousa, 2010) . The heap-based buffer overflow occurs when the buffer is located in the heap, which is the area of memory where dynamic data are stored. The stack buffer overflow occurs when the buffer is located in the stack, Attacks that exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities to inject malicious code are certainly among the most common and dangerous today (Riley et al., 2010 ). An example of this type of attack on a wireless system was identified in 2006 by researchers Dave Maynor and Jon Ellch (Murotake & Martin, 2009 ). This particular attack exploited vulnerabilities in the Atheros WiFi chip-set device drivers used in Apple computers, and allowed the adversary to have administrator access (root), even without the system being connected to a WiFi network. A similar attack was translated to the Broadcom WiFi chipset device drivers for Windows systems. These device drivers were used by several manufacturers (Dell, HP, Gateway, among others).
WiFi interfaces are constantly scanning the spectrum to search for available networks, as soon as the system is turned on, regardless if the computer is connected or not to a network. The attack exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability by broadcasting a malformed SSID (network access identifier). The malformed SSID was received by the target machine, allowing the adversary to inject executable code at the device driver level and then getting root access, overlapping security mechanisms such as firewalls and virus control.
There are several ways to prevent and mitigate the effects of code injection attacks via buffer overflow. Examples are static code analysis or the implementation of dynamic protection mechanisms (Correia & Sousa, 2010) . Current operating systems (e.g., Windows, Linux) and C/C++ compilers already implement several mechanisms against buffer overflow attacks, such as canaries (Cowan et al., 1998) , stack cookies (Howard & LeBlanc, 2007) , address space layout randomization (van de Ven, 2005) , and non-executable stacks. As an example of a dynamic protection strategy based on an architectural approach, it was recently published (Riley et al., 2010) a promising proposal to prevent code injection attacks that exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities. In this work, the authors proposed a virtualized Harvard architecture over the memory architectures of modern computers (von Neumann), including those without support for non-executable memory pages, as a way to prevent injection of malicious code. A Harvard architecture is one in which data and code are entirely separate. Any code injection will be made on the data partition, so the malicious code cannot be executed. The authors implemented this proposal as a software patch for Linux, incurring a performance loss of about 10% to 20%. This approach, however, has limitations. It is not adequate to protect selfmodifying programs (Giffin, Christodorescu, & Kruger, 2005) , and offers no protection when the attack executes code that was not injected by the adversary.
Another mechanism for dynamic protection of processes against code injection via buffer overflow vulnerabilities is described in Abadi, Budiu, Erlingsson, and Ligatti (2009) . This work describes a mitigation technique, the enforcement of Control Flow Integrity (CFI), that is effective against stack-based buffer overflow and heap-based "jump-to-libc" attacks. The CFI property states that software execution must follow a path of a Control Flow Graph (CFG) determined ahead of time. In this work, the construction of the CFG is done through a static binary analysis. The authors also presented fast, scalable implementations of CFI for Windows on the x86 architecture. All in all, It should be highlighted that choosing the most appropriate protection mechanism against code injection will depend on several factors: what are the processing elements available in the SDR, available memory, set of waveforms that will be deployed, etc.
• Waveform Downloading -Downloading waveforms through the air interface (RF) is one of the main features associated with SDRs in general and with SCA-compliant radios in particular. The waveform download process consists of three phases (Wireless Innovation Forum, 2002):
• Pre-Download: includes service discovery, selection of security mechanisms, mutual authentication, user authorization, download acceptation; • Download: software physical transfer, integrity check of received code, potential retransmission request and storage in a safe place; • Post-Download: consisting of installation, validation, non-repudiation and SDR reconfiguration.
However, this feature introduces several important security issues (Stango & Prasad, 2009) . One of these security issues happens when malicious software is loaded instead of the original waveform. In this type of attack, the adversary may exploit vulnerabilities associated with the download protocol and the process of waveform instantiation on the SDR. Malicious software can be installed by waveform downloading if mechanisms to ensure code authenticity, integrity and versioning in the download and post-download phases are not available. Moreover, it may force a military network to operate with a non-optimal waveform -for instance, a waveform typically used for low-error rate channel conditions (e.g., a line-of-sight UHF low-mobility networks), may be downloaded for operation on a harsh environment (e.g., a VHF ground-to-air multipath propagation channel or a non-line of sight VHF urban scenario), which would severely degrade a previously agreed quality-of-service level, in spite of being a previously authorized waveform.
Concerning this aspect, Stango and Prasad (2009) propose a mechanism based on policies to ensure the secure download of reconfiguration files, which includes waveforms, in a SDR. On the other hand, Brawerman, Blough, and Bing (2004) propose a secure protocol for downloading reconfiguration files in a SDR. In addition, this paper proposes a lightweight version of SSL (LSSL) for the connection between the server and the radio set, and a protocol to securely download files to the SDR. An equivalent protocol is proposed in Gallery and Mitchell (2006) .
• Radio Start-up: The malicious software can also be embedded in non-volatile memory used for initialization (e.g., BIOS), during the radio set manufacturing process or later, through physical access to the SDR. This type of attack is associated with vulnerabilities in the system start-up (Gallery & Mitchell, 2006) , which are generally related to the integrity verification of the start-up routines before execution.
For instance, malicious software may alter the transmission power level adopted by a radio set on a military network. Such modification does not keep the agreed communication to take place, but inserts vulnerabilities on allied communications, since it may allow an enemy force with electronic warfare capabilities to monitor, search, intercept and decode unauthorized data.
When the SDR deploys several separate partitions, as in a MILS system (Alves-Foss, Harrison, Oman, & Taylor, 2006) , each partition may have a separate boot process. As a result, partitions different from the compromised one may not be affected. Still, such attack can make the SDR unusable or subject to external control, depending on the attacked partition. It is worth IGI GLOBAL PROOF noting that the SCA v.2.2 security supplement defines safe boot requirements only for the cryptographic subsystem (SCA Security, 2001 ).
Personification
In the Personification class of attacks, the adversary presents himself as another entity, different from the original. For example, an adversary can impersonate a server, a network, a radio set or act as a man-in-the-middle. An attack of this class can have several goals, for example, to access or modify information in transit, to send outdated or invalid data to the SDR to reduce its functionality, or simply to allow the adversary to present himself as an authorized correspondent, gaining access or changing the SDR behavior.
This class of attacks can explore various types of vulnerabilities, often associated with protocols. For example, vulnerabilities in the data transmission protocol of a waveform may allow replay attacks (Wireless Innovation Forum, 2010). In the replay attack, the adversary captures a copy of the transmitted information and relays it later, and it can be exploited, for example, in any SCA-compliant data transmission waveform that does not implement sequence numbers, challenges or a freshness scheme (van Dijk, Rhodes, Sarmenta, & Devadas, 2007 ). An example of a waveform that allows replay attacks is the IEEE 802.11-WEP (Berghel & Uecker, 2005) . Replay attacks can also be used to distribute obsolete waveforms (possibly with known vulnerabilities), which were previously stored by an adversary, for several radio sets belonging to a radio network.
If the SDR deploys waveforms that require some form of authentication between devices, another type of attack can occur if the authentication protocol contains vulnerabilities. Examples of waveforms with authentication vulnerabilities are several implementations of IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) including WEP, WPA-PSK or EAP / LEAP (Berghel & Uecker, 2005) .
Several radio sets implement internal geolocators. Examples include military radios (SCA-compliant or not) and cognitive radios. One of the easiest ways to implement a geolocator is via a civilian GPS receiver, which can also be set by software in a SDR. GPS receivers may be subject to an impersonation attack known as GPS spoofing, which consists of sending wrong location signals to a receiver position (Humphreys, Ledvina, Psiaki, O'Hanlon, & Kintner, 2008) . These attacks are relatively simple to perform in civilian GPS receivers, since these receptors do not implement countermeasures against such attacks. In fact, impersonation attacks on civilian GPS receivers can be performed even through commercial GPS signal simulators. However, this simple attack is also the easiest to detect. More sophisticated attacks require the use of portable receiver-spoofer devices (Humphreys et al., 2008) . This latter attack can be done by a single device or a set of coordinated devices.
Unauthorized Data Modification
In the Unauthorized modification of data class of attacks, the adversary aims to modify data that is stored or transmitted by SDR. The unauthorized modification of data or software can impair the security or functionality of the radio set. This class of attacks includes the possibility of unauthorized modification of internal parameters of a SCA waveform. So, it may alter different radio set features, like a protocol internal configuration setup, a control data flow, or even a user-driven message data that is under transmission.
As in previous cases, a number of vulnerabilities can be exploited to carry out an attack of this class. For example, an adversary can exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities, via code injection attacks, to perform unauthorized data modification.
The unauthorized modification of data can also be performed by exploiting vulnerabilities in hardware. A processor is usually described in about 500 000 lines of VHDL code, which usually are not submitted to a formal verification process. Thus, it is expected that a processor may have multiple vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an adversary. Attacks can also make use of vulnerabilities introduced deliberately by an adversary. An example of vulnerability introduced by the adversary is the hardware trojan (Karri et al., 2010) . A hardware trojan is a deliberate, malicious and difficult to detect hardware modification in an electronic device. The hardware trojan can modify the functionality of an integrated circuit and undermines the system reliability and security. For example, we may consider a cryptographic processor that normally sends encrypted data to an output. When the trojan is active, the encryption is disabled and the data is sent in clear, without the system operators' awareness ( Figure 2 ) (Karri et al., 2010) . In this paper, we identify attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in hardware generally as hardware injection.
In addition to trojans, hardware vulnerabilities can be introduced through device cloning, which turns out to be another variant of hardware injection. In this case, we have a device (e.g., a board or an integrated circuit) that is physically the same as the original, but it contains malicious code or hardware and it does not have appropriate protection mechanisms to prevent the extraction of sensitive information (Gallo et al., 2009) . Unlike a hardware trojan, which is introduced during the chip manufacturing process, device clones are introduced during the transportation of the chip or board from its factory to the SDR assembly location. Attacks such as device cloning, which exploit vulnerabilities in the supply chain, are also associated with a wider class of attacks known as Supply Chain Attacks. Supply chain attacks involve the manipulation of hardware, software or services at any time during the life cycle of a device (Swanson et al., 2010) . This type of attack is typically carried out or facilitated by individuals or organizations with access to radio set components via commercial ties. The results of attacks on the supply chain are, in addition to modification of critical data, technology and sensitive data theft and deactivation of mission-critical features.
In the specific case of hardware trojans and device cloning, some preventive measures are proposed in Gallo et al. (2009) . In this work, the authors introduce the concept of Cryptographic Identity (CID) as a unique identifier created at the physical inspection of the final hardware. The CID allows the establishment and verification of a root of trust for secure commodity hardware. The CID is statistically unique, copy and tamper protected and verifiable. The physical hardware inspection used to create the CID defines what the authors call a secure device epoch. The authors also define shared verification schemes to attest CID validity. Verifications can be made throughout the device lifetime in order to ensure that the hardware has not been altered between successive utilizations. One of the verification schemes proposed in Gallo et al. (2009) Verification Code (TOTV), and a variation of this verification scheme is used in the Brazilian electronic voting machines (Gallo et al., 2010) . Even when the CID is not implemented, it is possible to detect hardware trojans through a number of countermeasures (Karri et al., 2010) , for instance: to check the RTL code of the I/O unit for changes in the I/O protocol; to perform exhaustive memory testing; to analyze the side-channels; to check exhaustively for resource utilization changes; to communicate periodically with the device, even after its deployment; to skew clocks and observe the IC transient behavior; to scale dynamically the supply voltage while checking for transient characteristics; to do the concurrent detection for soft errors; to use path delay fingerprints (Jin & Makris, 2008) . Regarding military systems, some agencies have restrained circuit designs to the factories which have passed certain certifications (Jin & Makris, 2008) .
Unauthorized Access to Data
In the Unauthorized access to data class of attacks, the objective is to access sensitive data or information stored in the SDR, without modifying them. Unauthorized access to sensitive information stored in the SDR can compromise the security and availability of the radio network, and this is a class of attacks usually difficult to detect. For example, such attacks can be aimed at obtaining cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters. The access to cryptographic keys, in turn, could allow the adversary to access encrypted data being transmitted between two radio sets, without regular users being aware of the eavesdropping. As described in the previous section, it may impact different radio set features, like a protocol internal configuration setup, a control data flow, or even a user-driven message data that is under transmission.
Unauthorized access to data can be done by exploiting several vulnerabilities, such as those related to the injection of malicious code and the use of hardware trojans and device clones. For example, in SCA-compliant radios that have a single partition for storing sensitive data and non-confidential information, privileged execution of malicious code can allow the adversary to access all data stored in the nonvolatile memory of the radio set, including the cryptographic keys. Critical information can then be transmitted in clear using a data transmission waveform deployed in the SDR itself, or the adversary may use any other external interface available.
Another example is related to hardware injections in cryptographic processors. Malicious hardware injected in these processors can cause the bypass mechanism in the JTRS security architecture (SCA Security, 2001) not to function properly, which can result in confidential information being transmitted in clear, like data protocol configuration parameters, which are vital to a proper communication protocol handshaking mechanism.
Another type of attack that belongs to this class is traffic analysis attacks. In such attack, the adversary aims to get mission-critical radio network information by observing traffic statistics (Fu, Graham, Bettati, & Zhao, 2003; Wireless Innovation Forum, 2010) . Critical information that can be obtained include senders and receivers identities, the establishment and termination of connections, consumption of bandwidth, bursty traffic, signal strength, etc. This type of attack can be divided into two types: passive and active. In the passive traffic analysis, the adversary passively collects data and performs several analysis tasks on the collected data. In the active traffic analysis, the adversary uses active probes in the process of gathering information to obtain additional data that cannot be obtained by passive collection. In this case, the adversary seeks to analyze the behavior of radio network elements when subjected to a specific stimulus (Fu et al., 2003) . Besides that, any modification on the transmission power level adopted by a military radio set is a potential tool of unauthorized access to any type of data, since it may allow an enemy force with electronic warfare capabilities to monitor, search, intercept and decode messages or even identify traffic patterns by mapping control and configuration data flow.
When the adversary has possession of an operational SDR, sensitive information (e.g., cryptographic keys) can be obtained through side-channel attacks, as described in Standaert, Malkin, and Yung (2009) and Chevallier-Mames, Ciet, and Joye (2004) . In this type of attack, the adversary collects and analyzes data related to several physical quantities, such as power consumption, processing time and electromagnetic emissions of the SDR internal circuitry, to gain access to sensitive information. As an illustration, there are several examples in the literature of how an attack of this type can be performed with the aim of breaking implementations of cryptographic algorithms (Kocher 1996; Kocher, Jaffe, & Jun, 1999; Agrawal, Archambeault, Rao, & Rohatgi, 2003; Bonneau & Mironov, 2006) . For example, in Agrawal et al. (2003) the authors focus on the analysis of electromagnetic signals emitted by the device under attack to break cryptographic algorithms and overcome countermeasures against other side-channel attacks, such as those based on power. The electromagnetic emissions of interest are originated from data processing operations, such as those observed in CMOS circuits. The authors describe successful attacks to block ciphers (DES) and public key algorithms (RSA) in chipcards, and to SSL accelerators using a single electromagnetic signal sensor (antenna). It is noteworthy that all the attacks described in Agrawal et al. (2003) are non-intrusive, noninvasive and does not require precise positioning of the electromagnetic sensors.
Another encryption algorithm that is susceptible to side-channel attacks is the AES-Rijndael (Bonneau & Mironov, 2006; Bogdanov, 2008; Renauld, Standaert, & Veyrat-Charvillon, 2009 ). For example, in Renauld et al. (2009) , it is shown that a class of side-channel attacks known as algebraic side-channel can be applied to the AES-Rijndael algorithm implemented in 8-bit controllers. The observation of a single trace (plaintext and corresponding ciphertext) may be sufficient to perform complete recovery of the encryption key in this context. The attack is directly applicable to certain masking schemes, i.e., schemes that make the power consumption of the processing device independent of the intermediate values processed by the cryptographic algorithm. Observe that the attack can be successful even if traces are not available. It is also interesting to note that the offline processing phase of the attack was limited, in that paper, to 3600 seconds.
Another type of attack that belongs to this class is fault-based attacks, which, as is the case of several side-channel attacks, requires ownership of an operational radio. In this type of attack, the adversary induces faults in hardware in order to gain access to sensitive information. An example of this type of attack is described in Pellegrini, Bertacco, and Austin (2010) . In this paper, the authors describe how to obtain a 1024-bit RSA private key in a Linux SPARC system through the insertion of processing errors by decreasing the supply voltage of the processor. By introducing faults in the processing of the fixed window exponentiation algorithm (FWE) used in OpenSSL-0.9.8i, the authors were able to get the 1024-bits private key after 100 hours of offline processing, in a Pentium 4 cluster with 81 nodes. It should be highlighted that this type of attack does not damage the target machine, leaving no signs that its security has been compromised, as is the case for side-channel attacks.
Considering attacks that exploit sidechannel and fault-based vulnerabilities, it is possible to deploy countermeasures to mitigate these attacks in the process of physical construction of the radio set. Several countermeasures are described in standards FIPS140-2, level 4 (Federal Information Processing Standards, 2001) and FIPS 140-3, level 4 (Federal Information Processing Standards, 2009) . Some of the possible countermeasures are (Gallo et al., 2010; Agrawal et al., 2003; Federal Information Processing Standards, 2001 : the implementation of constant-duration cryptographic operations to mitigate timing analysis attacks; to filter and to stabilize the power supply and to decouple all external communication connectors to mitigate attacks based on power variation; to involve circuit boards in inviolable coatings (e.g., resins); the use of electromagnetic shielding to reduce the power of compromising electromagnetic emanations; the frequent redefinition of cryptographic keys; the deletion of cryptographic keys and other critical data if the SDR casing is opened or tampered with.
Social engineering attacks (Goodchild, 2010; Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & Menczer, 2007; Ferguson, 2005) , which consists on the manipulation of people to obtain confidential information, can also be used to obtain sensitive information from a radio set. These attacks involve the use of tricks to deceive one or more individuals within an organization, and often the adversary never meet personally with the misled individuals. Social engineering can be applied through various methods, e.g., personification of superiors or colleagues, phishing (Jagatic et al., 2007) , etc. This attack involves individuals who have specific knowledge or have physical access to the radio device, and can be highly effective in military institutions (Ferguson, 2005) . For example, the action of a single operator can enable an electromagnetic emission side-channel attack by placing a data collector device near the SDR, influenced by an adversary impersonating a superior officer. The data collector device would then be returned by the operator to the adversary, whom can process the collected data offline.
Denial of Service
A denial of service attack aims to make the SDR unavailable or non-operational. This type of attack can exploit several vulnerabilities, for example: buffer overflow vulnerabilities, protocol vulnerabilities, hardware trojans, jamming and flooding. In the scope of this paper, jamming is defined as the deliberate transmission of radio signals that interfere with the radio communication between two devices by reducing the signal-to-noise ratio. Jamming attacks can be used in wireless data transmission to stop the flow of information between two communicating entities (Frankel, Eydt, Owens, & Scarfone, 2007; Brown & Sethi, 2007) . In turn, in the flooding attack an adversary sends a large number of messages, related to a particular waveform, to a radio device at a rate so high that the SDR cannot process all the messages in time (Frankel et al., 2007) . This over-capacity processing can result in a partial or total denial of service.
As an illustration of possible attacks on military radio set, consider the frame structure for all MIL-STD-188-110 B (U. S. Department of Defense, 2000) waveforms, used to convey interoperability for data modems on several frequency bands. Based on that standard, an initial 287 symbol preamble is sent, being followed by a 72 frames sequence of alternating data and known symbols. Each data frame is made of a data block consisting of 256 data symbols, followed by a mini-probe sequence with 31 symbols of known data. After that 72 data frames sequence, a 72 symbol subset of the initial preamble is reinserted to facilitate late acquisition, Doppler shift removal, and synchronization adjustment. So, any change on the synchronization sequence or on the quantity of data frames make the military network unavailable or non-operational, since it keeps the receiver radio set from recognizing the adopted communication protocol.
A common denial of service attack occurs when the adversary sends a spurious signal that prevents the reception of the signal transmitted legitimately (Brown & Sethi, 2007) . This brute force approach can be applied to any type of radio transmission. There are situations, in the case of data transmissions, in which such attacks are effective even when the adversary is transmitting low power spurious signals (Lin & Noubir, 2003) . One way to make a radio network more robust to these attacks is the use of spread spectrum techniques (spread-spectrum), such as direct sequence spread-spectrum or frequency hopping (Strasser, Popper, Capkun, & Cagalj, 2008) . However, these techniques are only effective if the secret code shared between sender and receiver, which enables the spread spectrum, is not compromised. The use of cognitive radio techniques can also make this attack more difficult, since an adversary may have to transmit spurious signals simultaneously in various frequency bands, or to implement reliable techniques for detecting when the cognitive radio switches between different frequencies (Brown & Sethi, 2007) .
For denial of service attacks that involve the transmission of power signals that prevent the communication between radio sets, an interesting solution related to waveform implementation was proposed in Strasser et al. (2008) . The authors propose a non-coordinated frequency hopping mechanism, where radio sets do not need to share a secret key or code that allows for the frequency hop. The basic idea is that, after enough transmission attempts, the sender and the receiver will transmit and receive in the same channels in some intervals of time, even without a previous agreement on these intervals. The price to pay is a reduced transmission rate, but even this reduced rate of transmission is sufficient to perform a key sharing protocol that allows a more efficient subsequent communication. This mechanism can be very useful if the adversary succeeds in obtaining the secret code related to the frequency hop through an attack of the class unauthorized access to data.
Geolocators based on GPS signals may also be subject to denial of service attacks (Brown & Sethi, 2007) . GPS signals are weak and easily masked by power emissions. In addition, GPS signals fade indoors, in dense urban areas or in steep terrain. The best strategy in this case is to implement, in the radio set, several different strategies to infer the geographic location beyond GPS.
SCA IMPACTS
In this section we provide a description of how attack mitigation strategies can impact the development of an SCA-compliant software infrastructure. In this section, we focus mainly on the components of the SCA operating environment, as described previously. We start with an analysis of the basic JTRS security architecture (Figure 1 ) and related impacts on the location of SCA components and on overall radio security.
SCA security architecture: The basic JTRS security architecture described in SCA Security (2001) and depicted in Figure 1 defines three independent partitions: red, black and the cryptographic subsystem. The red partition holds unencrypted (confidential) data, while the black partition only handles encrypted data. The RF module is connected to the black partition, while the red partition has access to the user I/O interface. Actually, the red-black paradigm was originated to address Tempest (1982 Tempest ( , 1985 separation of analog circuits, and this tradition influenced the organization of radio functions also by red and black partitions. It is noteworthy that the three partitions can be implemented either physically (e.g., using three processing elements physically separated) or logically (via separation kernels), as discussed in the next subsection (RTOS).
Both the red and black partitions contain a full SCA stack, and most SCA components are replicated in both partitions, with few exceptions. One major exception is the Domain Manager. In a SCA-compliant radio, the Domain Manager component controls the whole radio domain and there is one Domain Manager per radio set. There are advantages and disadvantages of allocating the radio control component either in the red or black partition (Davidson, 2008) . Usually, the Domain Manager is instantiated in the red partition and it uses the bypass mechanism to communicate with components in the black partition. If the black partition is compromised due, for instance, an attack that exploits buffer overflow vulnerabilities, the confidential data stored in the red partition is not exposed. Furthermore, due to the hardware implementation of cryptographic algorithms and other security features in the cryptographic subsystem, there is enough computing power in this architecture to encrypt/decrypt all data that are transmitted or received. Beyond that, the hardware components of the cryptographic subsystem provide a reliable root-of-trust for the radio set as a whole. A hardware root-oftrust is important because trusting all the radio software is an unreasonable option (Davidson, 2008) . However, the widespread utilization of the bypass mechanism in some implementations represents a major weakness of the red-black paradigm (Davidson, 2008) . Nevertheless, the basic security architecture may be effective to mitigate risks related to the attack class's unauthorized access to data, Unauthorized data modification, and Radio Control.
Real-Time Operating Systems (RTOS)
The RTOS provides several services for the upper layers of the operating environment, including:
• Process/thread creation; • Process/thread management; • Inter-process communication;
• Timing services; • Input/output management; • Scheduling management.
It should be highlighted that process separation and data isolation are fundamental security features that should be supported by the operating system (SCA Security, 2001). Beyond those features, the RTOS should also provide dynamic protection mechanisms against buffer overflow attacks. Examples of dynamic protection mechanisms currently available for Linux systems are Stack Smashing Protectors and Address Space Layout Randomization (Correia e Souza, 2010) . These measures increase the level of difficulty for an adversary to perform a successful intrusion. Even when an attack of the class Radio Control results in an intrusion, thanks to the isolation of partitions suggested in the JTRS security architecture, a possible impairment of the black partition by a buffer overflow based attack, e.g., via the RF interface, allows only partial control of SDR by the adversary. The security supplement recommends the physical isolation among partitions also because of concerns about spurious emanations (Tempest, 1982 (Tempest, , 1995 . However, for SDRs in which requirements such as weight and battery duration are critical, the recent emergence of separation kernels with a high level of assurance, such as those classified as EAL 6+ (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2008) , makes the logical separation among partitions a viable alternative. The utilization of separation kernels also enables the implementation of Multilevel Secure (MLS) SDRs. An example of a MLS capable OS is the GEMSOS security kernel (Aesec, 2012) . GEMSOS is rated Class A1: Verified Protection by the National Security Agency. Indeed, the problem with full MLS systems is that they must be rigorously analyzed for security before they can be certified. Every portion of the MLS system must be analyzed to ensure that it properly handles labeled data and that there is no possible violation of the security policy. Therefore, there is often too much to evaluate.
The concept of separation kernels is tightly related to MILS (Multiple Independent Levels of Security) capable systems (Alves-Foss et al., 2006; Beckwith, Vanfleet, & MacLaren, 2004) . The MILS architecture was developed to resolve the difficulty of certification of MLS systems, by separating out the security mechanisms and concerns into manageable components. MILSenabled systems make mathematical verification possible for the core systems software by reducing the security functionality to four key security policies (Beckwith et al., 2004) A MILS system employs one or more separation mechanisms (e.g., Separation kernel, Partitioning Communication System, physical separation) to assure data and process separation. A MILS RTOS system is designed to minimize the size of the kernel in order to make it verifiable by formal analysis and proof-ofcorrectness methods. The price related to this approach is more context switch overhead. However, this cost has been made more tolerable by hardware advances and careful design of the inter-partition communication services.
Concerning the flow of information inside the kernel, an information flow policy is required to avoid unauthorized bypass of security functions. The information flow policy should be enforced by the inter-process communication functionality inside the kernel. A particular threat arises from the chances to forge IPC objects that are shared between processes (Kiszka & Wagner, 2007) . In order to mitigate the risks associated with this threat, separated namespaces can be established to isolate adversaries' from legitimate registration requests (Kiszka & Wagner, 2003) .
As pointed out in the previous section, device drivers can be a major source of vulnerabilities inside an operating system kernel. The set of device drivers that should be available in a radio set depends on the underlying hardware, and in many cases several custom drivers should be developed. Therefore, in order to minimize the number of vulnerabilities in a radio set, thorough analysis of device drivers is mandatory. For instance, in (Ball et al., 2006) the authors present the Static Driver Verifier (SDV) tool, which uses static code analysis to enhance both the observability and coverage of device driver testing.
In Kiszka and Wagner (2007) , the authors introduced a class of attacks related specifically to real-time operating systems dubbed Denial of Determinism (DoD). This class groups attacks against hard real-time services, aiming at the denial to obtain those services at any time both correctly and timely. In Kiszka and Wagner (2007) , several DoD attacks are described, e.g., timer storm attack, wakeup list attack, priority inheritance chain attack, etc. The foundation to mitigate the risks of DoD attacks is the RealTime Domain and Type Enforcement (RT-DTE) model, which is an access control model applicable on hard-RT environment, as introduced in (Kiszka and Wagner, 2007) . The main idea of the original Domain and Type Enforcement model is to group processes (subjects) to domains and objects to types and to define the access rights of subjects on objects or other subjects. This is extended in RT-DTE by additional, realtime related properties of domain and types. Normally, the RT-DTE needs to contain only a few domains and types compared to the large number available in non-real-time entities.
Vulnerabilities in the operating system are related to attacks of the classes Radio Control, Unauthorized Data Modification, Unauthorized Access to Data, and Denial of Service.
Middleware
The middleware security approach is to control message traffic among objects by restricting access to object references within the system (SCA Security, 2001). For instance, each object, upon instantiation, registers with the ORB naming service by performing a bind() operation. This naming service may reside inside the SCA Domain Manager process space. Therefore, only entities within the SCA Domain Manager process space shall be permitted to perform resolve() and list() operations, protecting object references from being discovered by unauthorized entities. One potential problem with this approach, related to the basic JTRS security architecture, is the proliferation of bypass channels to allow naming service access to components located both in red and black partitions. Nevertheless, it is recommended that the system high middleware security policy should be enforced by the DomainManager, ApplicationFactory, and Naming Service (SCA Security, 2001) .
SCA components can use CORBA sequences to send data between components. A CORBA sequence is a CORBA version of a variable length one-dimensional array. Like container classes (i.e., STL vector), it allows for an array of any data type including complex data types like structures. This particular feature helps increase radio security by providing an error path if a malicious user injects bad data that causes the software to write data outside the sequence (Balister, Robert, & Reed, 2006) . Beyond that, the CORBA sequence provides bounds checking as well as memory management.
The SCA security supplement mandates implicit authorization for prevention of unauthorized access of CORBA objects. Implicit authorization means that handing over an object reference to a client authorizes the client to access the respective object. The problem with this approach is the risk of attacks where adversaries can in many cases fabricate object references for valid objects, sometimes demanding modest computational effort and time (Becker et al., 2007) . In this case, the implementation of an additional logic of explicit access rights (e.g., through the CORBA Security Service specified by the OMG, 2002) may be a solution to avoid this particular attack. Other possible countermeasure, when eavesdropping in the transport connection is not possible, is the inclusion of an unpredictable bit sequence (used once) in each object key contained in object references (Becker et al., 2007) .
The vulnerabilities associated to the middleware are mostly related to attacks of the class Unauthorized Access to Data.
Core Framework
In Bard and Kovarik (2007) several requirements related to the SCA core framework are listed. Some of the more important requirements are described.
• Application interface: In Bard and
Kovarik (2007) Other possible sources of vulnerabilities in a SCA-compliant radio set are SCA Devices. SCA devices should interact with OS device drivers, which may contain vulnerabilities as discussed in previous paragraphs. Beyond that, a SCA device should implement several concurrent state machines. The SCA v2.2.2 specification requires SCA Devices to implement behavior to support the administrative, usage, and operational states of the device (SCA, 2006) . The SCA required state management behavior is a variation of the X.731 specification (International Telecommunication Union, 2012) . If the implementation is not thoroughly checked, may let the system into a deadlock state under special circumstances. These vulnerabilities can be exploited by adversaries with knowledge of the implementation internal details.
R-check (Ezick & Springer, 2011; Ezick, Springer, Litvinov, & Wohlford, 2010 ) is a static source code analysis tools specially tailored to check SCA Core Framework requirements. Static analysis refers to analysis performed by inspecting a program source or binary code without executing it. R-check has been used to analyze operating environments and production waveforms. Since some requirements are related to secure software development practices, such as avoiding memory leaks (Ezick & Springer, 2011) , this type of tool can also be used to minimize the number of vulnerabilities present in Core Framework implementations.
These security requirements are related to attacks of the classes Radio Control and Unauthorized Access to Data.
SCA Services
The name service defined in the SCA specification (SCA, 2001 (SCA, , 2006 may be used by an adversary to discover system components' object references if there is no mechanism to avoid unauthorized queries. As mentioned earlier, the SCA security supplement suggests the instantiation of the naming service inside the DomainManager process space. Therefore, only entities within the DomainManager process space shall be permitted to perform resolve() and list() operations, protecting object references from being discovered by unauthorized entities but introducing other potential vulnerabilities related to bypass channels. Another possibility is to include access control mechanisms in the process of object reference resolving, possibly through the use of a security service like CORBAsec (OMG, 2002) . The need for an access control service that provides authentication and authorization has already been highlighted in previous subsections, and it should be included in the set of SCA services in a secure radio implementation.
The SCA v2.2 security supplement also suggests the implementation of a Installer service. From a security perspective, having a central installer is essential since it is the central component governing the overall software installation processes in a radio (Fitton, 2002) . Through this component, it is possible to verify the integrity and authenticity of a downloaded waveform, for instance. The description of the Installer component in the security supplement includes only its security requirements, without a detailed discussion of the associated security mechanisms (SCA, 2006) . The correct implementation of an Installer service is mandatory to avoid or mitigate attacks of the class Radio Control.
NEW RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this section, we identify several research directions related SDR radio security. Some directions are related to the minimization of the number of vulnerabilities present in SCAcompliant operating environments, but there is also a need for new research related to basic radio security architecture, as described.
• (Ezick & Springer, 2011; Ezick et al., 2010) . However, this tool was developed having compliance check as it main objective. New tools need to be developed that takes into account SCA vulnerability detection explicitly, minimizing both false positives and false negatives. The need for new, specific tools is reinforced by the utilization of some new mechanisms in SCA 4.0, such as optional inheritance (SCA, 2012) .
Detecting errors and vulnerabilities in compile time for specific classes of applications is also a potential research direction for SDR systems. Tools in this area are based on model checking, theorem proving, type systems, program analysis and a combination of these techniques. A possible field of interest is Meta-level compilation (Engler, Chelf, Chou, & Hallem, 2000) , i.e., to extend the process of code compilation with application-specific information (Engler, 1997; Engler et al., 2000) , which can be SCA specific information.
• Alternative mechanisms for implicit authorization in CORBA: The security supplement of SCA v2.2 (SCA Security, 2001) mandates implicit authorization for the prevention of unauthorized access to CORBA objects. In Becker, Staamann, and Salomon (2007), the authors describe several possible attacks on the implicit authorization mechanism, in particular attacks based on the fabrication of CORBA object references from addressing information the adversary can learn relatively easily such as object keys. It remains to be investigated the implementation feasibility of possible countermeasures, either the ones suggested in (Becker et al., 2007) or other alternatives, in SCA v2.2.2 and SCA 4.0 operating environments. Examples of countermeasures are unpredictable object keys and the implementation of explicit authorization and access control at the CORBA level.
• Alternatives for red-black architectures:
As pointed out in Davidson (2008) , the redblack paradigm has originated from TEM-PEST techniques and has some weaknesses when translated to a SDR framework. One major weakness is the way that radio control is placed and the consequence need for several bypass channels. If control is located in the black side, it is placed in the same domain that contains adversaries. If is located in the red partition, it generates a proliferation of bypass on SDR flow paths. Besides that, red partition control places radio control across the red-black boundary from the black assets it controls, so control flow goes on the wrong direction to preserve secrecy of the red side (Bell & LaPadula, 1975) . Therefore, there is a need to investigate alternatives to the red-black basic architecture. One alternative was proposed in Davidson (2008) . The architecture proposed in Davidson (2008) for MLS SDRs is based on multiple processors and hardware one-way links in an Asymmetric Isolation architecture (Davidson, 1996) , as an alternative to MLS OS. Instead of a red domain, it has a separate plaintext (PT) classified domain for each classification level. Instead of a black domain, it has separate ciphertext (CT-unclassified) traffic and control domains. Therefore, the radio has two control elements: one for secret (PT) set-up and control and another for unclassified (CT) set-up and control, connected to an external MLS planner. This last element can be a source of vulnerabilities if not thoroughly checked and validated. Further research is needed to evaluate this architecture and to propose additional improvements, both on architecture models and on secure systems engineering processes.
• SCA-specific dynamic test tools: There is a need for SCA specific dynamic test tools that can, for instance, pinpoint deadlock conditions related to SCA device implementations. Since many SCA devices are platform specific, the introduction of new hardware devices in a radio set generally requires the development of new SCA devices. This new devices should be thoroughly checked, both statically and dynamically, to avoid the introduction of new vulnerabilities in the system. Although there are SCA specific static test tools available, and also static tools specifically designed for device driver verification (Ball et al., 2006) , there is a need for new tools that perform dynamic testing taking into account specifics of the SCA standard, such as SCA Device state and management behavior.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we identify several classes of attacks aimed at SCA-compliant radios after an extensive literature survey. We also identify several possible sources of vulnerabilities in a SCA v 2.2.x operating environment, and discuss related research directions. Concerning attack classes, it should be noted that the set of attacks and threads that are relevant to a radio set depend on its particular architecture, and therefore they are precisely defined during the execution of the radio-specific security engineering process. Ideally, security engineering should be incorporated into the design of a system as soon as possible, that is, in the initial architecture specification. The sooner the security issues are addressed, the lower is the cost and the time needed to fix future security problems (Myagmar et al., 2005) . The identification of classes of attacks and threats is part of the security modeling process, which is prior to defining the radio set security requirements and the design of the corresponding security architecture (Myagmar et al., 2005) .
However, this is not a one way process. The definition of security requirements and the identification of new threats, when designing the security architecture, may require the review and the improvement of the initial modeling. Thus, we consider that the attack classes identified in this study define a point of departure for the thread analysis and the requirements definition related to the security engineering process of a SCA-compliant radio. 
